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The Imperial State of Iran, A Deal-Broker: Enabling the People’s
Republic of China’s Asian Games Debut in the 1974 Tehran Asian
Games
The former Imperial State of Iran was a critical actor and deal-broker in
orchestrating the Asian Games Federation’s admission of the All-China Sports
Federation and expulsion of the Republic of China Olympic Committee in 1973
and enabling China’s Asian Games debut in Tehran in September 1974. Notably,
it achieved this disruptive and historic outcome largely through offering good
offices and adhering to institutionalism. In particular, Iran convinced the IOC to
retain its patronage to the AGF and facilitated fruitful negotiations between
People’s Republic of China and the international sport governing bodies to
ensure the issuance of event permits. Despite the occasionally provocative
statements of Iranian officials against the IOC and IFs while playing the role of
Communist China’s advocate, Tehran also managed to persuade Beijing to make
seemingly small but actually critical comprises while interacting with
international governing bodies. These compromises proved essential to China’s
eventual rehabilitation in international sport.
Keywords: Iran; Asian Games; Asian Games Federation; Chinese sport

A Historic Debut in Tehran
On the afternoon of September 1, 1974, the Seventh Asian Games’ Opening Ceremony
took place inside the Aryamehr Stadium of Tehran, Iran. Besides the largest and possible
best stadium so far in the Asian Games’ history and the extravagant celebrations, those
Games differed greatly from their previous renditions in that, since their birth, a
delegation from the People’s Republic of China (PRC or habitually China), instead of the
Republic of China (ROC or habitually Taiwan), represented China for the first time.1
Before Shah Muhammed Reza Pahlavi of Iran declared open the Games, President of the
Tehran Asian Games Organizing Committee (TAGOC), General Ali Hodjat Kashani,
delivered a speech and especially commented that the debut of the Chinese athletes
magnified the significance of those Games.2 Correspondingly, the Chinese national sports

governing body, the All-China Sports Federation (ACSF), congratulated the TAGOC on
hosting an ‘unprecedented convention in the history of Asian sports’ and envisaged the
Games’ ‘tremendous contribution…to the Asian people’s friendship and solidarity’.3
Interestingly, the proposition of the PRC’s participation seemed to have originated
not from China itself, but from Iran. The Asian Games Federation (AGF) awarded Iran
the right to host the 1974 Asian Games in 1968, and the organization and preparation of
the Tehran Asian Games largely concurred with the Sino-Iran diplomatic rapprochement.
In the late 1960s and early 1970s, the Shah of Iran desired the support of Communist
China to gain his country’s leverage primarily with the Soviet Union and also, though
less importantly, with the United States; Chairman Mao Zedong of China, on the other
hand, desired to include the Middle Eastern power in the Chinese-led united front against
the two Cold War superpowers’ hegemony.4 It is not a surprise that existing literature on
China-Iran relations has little to offer on the topic of China’s participation in the
upcoming Asian Games: the Great Proletarian Cultural Revolution (hereafter the Cultural
Revolution), a nationwide extremist-leftist socio-political movement that took place from
1966 to 1976, had almost utterly dismantled the Chinese elite sport system, which played
a minimally constructive role, if at all, in the PRC’s political terrain from 1967 to 1970,
not to mention that sport was usually not among the major issues during the establishment
of diplomatic relations between two countries.
However, it would not be surprising, either, if the bilateral correspondence did at
times cover sporting exchanges. Prince Gholam-Reza Pahlavi, the Shah’s half-brother,
was a prominent figure in both Iranian politics and Asian sports. Despite the scarce
sources regarding China and Iran’s pre-1972 negotiation over sporting affairs, it is clear
that the TAGOC secretly contacted the Chinese ambassador to Iran in early 1972,
extending the Shah’s wish for the PRC’s participation in the 1974 Asian Games.5 Beijing

embraced the proposal after rounds of debates within the State Sport Commission (SSC
or tiwei) and considered it a means to eventually replacing the ROC in the Olympic
Movement, with which Beijing had severed all relations for over a decade. In 1973, the
AGF, with Prince Pahlavi as its president and the Iranian Olympic Committee (INOC)
occupying its rotating presidency, swiftly admitted the ACSF and expelled the Olympic
Committee of the Republic of China (ROCOC).
However, the ROCOC was a member National Olympic Committee (NOC) in
good standing with the International Olympic Committee (IOC), and most of its affiliated
national sport federations with their respective International Federations (IFs). Therefore,
it required much more coordination, negotiations, and diplomacy from all parties of
interest to retain the IOC’s patronage to the AGF and for the TAGOC to obtain the IFs’
permits for the 14 sports in which China had entered to compete. Without the IOC’s
patronage or major IFs’ issuance of event permits, the Tehran Asian Games would not
have been recognized as the regional games of Asia, which would have greatly discounted
the significance of China’s debut.
Fortunately, the Chinese athletes secured the eligibility to compete in all 14 sports
after the International Swimming Federation (FINA) greenlit the participation of Chinese
divers, swimmers and water polo players in the natatorial events just before the Games
opened. This overall ‘victory’ was the result of tremendous efforts not only of China, but
also of Iran and the INOC-chaired AGF during the two years from 1972 to 1974. In fact,
because of the ongoing Cultural Revolution, Beijing had been following the principle of
zero official liaison with international organizations that officially or de facto recognized
Taiwan, including the IOC and most IFs, which China had long lambasted as pawns of
the U.S.-led imperialist powers.6 The Chinese sports officials exhibited limited
willingness to cooperate, and increased rigidity and hostility while demanding the

expulsion of the ROC’s national sport organizations from these organizations. Indeed, it
was the INOC, the TAGOC, and the AGF—all Iranian or run by Iranian officials—that
shouldered the role of brokering agreements between Beijing and the international
governing bodies: on the one hand, the Iranians advocated for China’s participation
before the IOC and the IFs; on the other, they persuaded Beijing to at least partially abide
by international norms and make concessions where the latter could.
This article examines the critical role that the former Imperial State of Iran—
specifically, the INOC, the TAGOC, and several key Iranian officials—played in the
events that led to the PRC’s debut at the 1974 Tehran Asian Games, with the help of
archival documents collected primarily from the Asian Games Collection at the Olympic
Studies Centre in Lausanne, Switzerland, and several secondary sources, including news
reports, memoirs, and existing literature. It first focuses on the Tehran-led endeavours
towards the AGF’s admission of the ACSF in 1973, and then discusses the ensuing
contribution of the Iranians to brokering agreements as the PRC bargained with the
international governing bodies for eligibility. In shedding light on this significant but
underresearched episode in Cold War-era Asian sport history, this article argues that these
efforts not only resulted from a majority of Asian nations’ wish to include China in Asian
sport, but also served Iran’s goals in international sport—demonstrating the ability to host
international sport mega-events—and in world politics—strengthening its status as a
regional power and gaining China’s increased support in security affairs—in the longer
term. With the two goals’ respective emphases on institutionalism and realpolitik, Iranian
sport officials must strategically navigate established norms in international sport
governance while serving the interests of the Iranian government. In addition, this article
also discusses the instrumental role that Iran’s mediation played in paving the road for
the IOC’s eventual admission of the Chinese Olympic Committee in the late 1970s.

Tehran Steers the Asian Games Federation Towards Beijing
Although the communication between Tehran and Beijing became more frequent after
Iran’s initial proposal, Iran did not make its invitation public until early 1973. The IOC
Technical Director, Artur Takač, visited Tehran twice in June and December of 1972, but
neither report of his visits mentioned a potential invitation for the PRC.7 Hassan Rassouli,
the secretary-general of the INOC and the TAGOC, did not mention China when
corresponding with the IOC and IFs to confirm the Tehran Games’ dates and program on
January 3, 1973, either.8 Rather, Iran chose a rather informal setting to tentatively break
the news to the IOC leadership in mid-January, when the Second All-African Games were
held in Lagos, Nigeria. Rassouli, while attending the Games upon invitation, met Lord
Killanin, IOC President from Ireland, and mentioned the possibility of Beijing’s
participation during their discussion of the 1974 Asian Games.9 China was not the sole
focus of the Iranians: in addition to the upcoming Asian Games themselves, Iran was also
eyeing the right of hosting the Olympic Games in the near future.10
Lord Killanin was keen on solving the ‘China question’ within the Olympic
Movement, but China’s competition in Tehran would mean the AGF’s admission of the
ACSF and exclusion of the ROCOC, which would not be easily justified within the IOC
and IFs, where the ROCOC and its affiliated national federations were members in good
standing—after all, the Asian Games needed the IOC’s patronage and IFs’ approval to be
the recognized regional games of Asia. At the IOC Executive Board meeting in Lausanne
in February 1973, the Irishman suggested and the Executive Board agreed that while the
IOC welcomed China’s rehabilitation in international sport, Beijing’s sport authority
must take steps to apply for and acquire membership with a minimum of five IFs of
Olympic sports and eventually of the IOC.11 This position was in direct opposition to that

of the PRC, which insisted that the international sport organizations must expel Taiwan
and automatically restore the Chinese NOC’s and national federations’ memberships.
This seemingly irreconcilable conflict, however, did not stop Iran from planning
China’s debut in Tehran the following year. After all, a successful solution of the longlasting ‘China question’, even only within Asia, could help Iran reap double benefits,
namely, China’s support in international politics and a strong boost for Tehran’s
candidature for Olympic Games host city. Iranian officials worked on two fronts under
the direction of Prince Gholam-Reza Pahlavi, with Lieutenant General Ali Hodjat
working with the Chinese government and Rassouli and his associates in the INOC and
the TAGOC—organizations that were de jure non-governmental—communicating with
the IOC and IFs.
Rassouli closely followed the IOC’s attitude and no longer concealed Iran’s
pursuit of China’s participation.12 In May, he attended the General Assembly of
International Federations (GAIF) in Oklahoma City. After Oscar State, Secretary-General
of the GAIF and the International Weightlifting Federation, informed the IF leaders of
the scant progress from his recent visit to China and the dim prospect of solving the
‘China question’ in the near future, the concerned Rassouli directly inquired about how
the TAGOC and the AGF could invite Chinese national federations that were not
affiliated to their respective IFs.13 State, a pro-Beijing Briton, obviously had studied the
rules of the Asian Games and answered that the TAGOC could invite the central sport
governing body of a country which did not have an IOC-recognized national committee.14
This reply was none other than a greenlight for the Iranian officials to stick to their plan.
A three-men delegation of the TAGOC whose members included Rassouli and
Richard Avory, an Iran-based Briton, visited Lord Killanin in Dublin, Ireland, in July.
Rassouli emphasized that the delegates visited in the name of the Organizing Committee

instead of the Iranian Olympic Committee to avoid potential backlash.15 With the goal of
eventually hosting the Olympic Games in mind, the Iranians must tread lightly when
interacting with international sport governing bodies—after all, the 1974 Asian Games
were intended to demonstrate that Iran was capable of hosting international sport megaevents. During the meeting, the Organizing Committee reported to the IOC President the
state of affairs: China had yet to submit a formal application for membership with the
AGF, but the latter planned to discuss the matter at the upcoming Executive Committee
meeting anyway; there was strong governmental support for China’s appearance among
Asian countries; and TAGOC had discussed the subject with some IFs, some of which
mentioned the possibility of issuing special permits.16 Lord Killanin offered a mixed
opinion: he told the TAGOC officials that the IOC itself would not interfere with AGF’s
decision-making, but that individual IFs must affirm the Chinese athletes’ eligibility in
each sport, though he warned that the AGF could face penalty for not inviting the
ROCOC.17 It was nothing less than a blessing for the Iranians.18
China’s application for AGF membership was not submitted until August—and
this single-page document proved to be the product of orchestrated multinational efforts.
In as early as May, General Hodjat visited Beijing to discuss the strategies of enabling a
swift admission of the ACSF to the AGF.19 Hodjat was a former assistant to the Iranian
Prime Minister and had ample, direct governmental connections. This made him an ideal
interlocutor for the Chinese sports officials, whose view of international sports were
deeply rooted in the prevalent political ideology of Communist China and who as
standard practice resorted to diplomatic channels for international sport affairs. Hodjat,
on behalf of the Iranian government and the INOC, strongly advised that China submit
an application for membership with the AGF so that Iran could start lobbying AGF
members.20 Specifically, Iran proposed that this application would first go through the

eleven-member AGF Executive Committee before it was presented to the federation’s
full council for a vote. As aforementioned, China had been adhering to a no-officialcontact policy when interacting with international organizations that recognized Taiwan,
and the ROCOC happened to be a member of the AGF. It was the more open-minded
Premier Zhou Enlai that eventually instructed the SSC and the ACSF to formally apply
with the precondition of expelling the Taiwanese representation.21
Two Chinese officials delivered the application, along with documents detailing
the ACSF’s organization structure and statutes that were supposed to comply with the
Olympic Charter, to Prince Pahlavi in Tehran on August 7. Tsuneyoshi Takeda, Prince
of Japan and IOC member, joined his Chinese and Iranians interlocutors in discussing the
matter of admitting the ACSF to the AGF. Indeed, Iran was not China’s sole ally. A
majority of Asian nations were in favour of China’s affiliation, and Asian governments
tended to have a greater sway on the decision-making and positions of national sport
organizations.22 In particular, Japan, Asia’s then-single athletic powerhouse, had been
another major supporter, probably only second to Iran, even before the normalization of
Sino-Japanese relations in 1972. Iranian officials had visited Japan in May to discuss or,
rather, plot the replacement of the ROCOC with the ACSF;23 and it was highly likely a
Japanese governmental delegation’s visit in late July that was the last nudge to push Zhou
Enlai to ‘respond correspondingly’ to their relentless support and order the Chinese sports
officials to apply for AGF affiliation.24
In the following month, Iran, China, and Japan meticulously prepared for the AGF
Executive Committee’s meeting in September in hope of an ideal outcome. Many debates
over the location took place before Prince Pahlavi picked Bangkok, Thailand. As for the
Executive Committee members’ voting intents, the projection was six in favour versus
five against, thanks to the fact that the INOC was occupying the AGF’s rotating

presidency and had three members on the Executive Committee. However, much to China
and its allies’ surprise and delight, those opposing the admission of the ACSF at the
expense of the ROCOC walked out in protest and easily delivered a five-to-zero sweep
in Beijing’s favour during the Executive Committee meeting on September 18. 25 Prince
Pahlavi declared that the AGF Council would convene and vote on the Executive
Committee’s resolution at a special meeting in November in Manila, the Philippines,
which was later changed to Tehran, which would be much more convenient for delegates
from the predominantly pro-Beijing Arab nations to travel to and, thus, much more
favourable to Beijing.26
With the special AGF Council meeting in less than 60 days, Iran and China went
on to pursue the most positive outcome, while Prince Takeda of Japan focused on
securing the support of IOC members from Asia and smoothing the AGF’s relations with
the IOC.27 One major dispute arose between Beijing and Tehran: Chinese officials
insisted that Iran, as a country with diplomatic relations with the PRC, should not allow
Taiwanese delegates to enter Iran for the meeting, whereas the Iranians considered it
necessary to include the Taiwanese representatives in the meeting so that the ROCOC’s
potential expulsion would seem as fair as possible.28 General Hodjat managed to persuade
the visiting Chinese officials, He Zhenliang and Luo Dapeng, in October, and China
acquiesced to the Shah’s extending a special exemption to the Taiwanese officials from
the entry ban.29 Iranian officials also showed great determination to China: Hodjat
suggested the possibility of forming an Asian-African-Latin American coalition to
counter the IFs’ sanctions, should they react negatively to the AGF’s admission of the
ACSF; and Prince Pahlavi, at the banquet hosted by the Chinese Embassy in Tehran,
revealed that Iran gave up Tehran’s candidacy for the 1980 Olympic Games in exchange
for the Soviet Union’s non-opposition to China’s debut at the Asian Games and avowed

that Iran would not host the Asian Games without China’s participation.30 In the days
before the special AGF Council meeting, China allegedly flexed diplomatic muscles in
pressuring delegates from other Asian countries, such as Sri Lanka, the Philippines, and
Malaysia, to vote in Beijing’s favour, and Iran also sent three delegations to lobby for
more votes.31
The meeting on November 15 and 16 went very much in China and its allies’
favour—the eventual tally indicated an overwhelming sweep, 38 votes in favour versus
13 against with five members abstaining.32 Among the pro-Beijing delegates, Rassouli
was one of the most unreserved to voice his support. There was a shared tenet among a
majority of the attendees that Asians, instead of allowing excessive Western intervention
and constraints, should decide their own matters—this belief was the core of panAsianism, an ideology that evolved over time and centred on the unity of Asian nations
and priority of Asian values free of Western interference in the era of decolonialization
and nation-building. The expression of this collective sentiment only grew stronger after
Padilla of the Philippines, in the hopes of averting the inevitable, mentioned the IAAF’s
threat of sanctions.33 After Shah of Nepal and Hassan of Pakistan delivered their
counterarguments, Rassouli gave a passionate speech on behalf of the Iranian delegation
that most powerfully summed up the prevalent sentiment on the floor,
The Asian Games Federation’s motto is ‘ever onward’ and I believe sincerely that
the move that I hope this eminent body here today will take will be step in the right
direction…We have been threatened with sanctions. But who are these bodies, who
are these superlords [sic], these great gnomes of sports sitting in Europe, these
remnants of the old colonial policies of Europe dominating Asia, Africa, Latin
American? Who are these self-imposed great personalities sitting and dictating to
us what and how we should conduct the affairs of our own destiny…If the
International Amateur Athletic Federation dare, and I say dare, tell a body such as
the Asian Games Federation, who they should decide to have as a member

otherwise they are going to threaten them with sanction with this and the other then
we shall not take it, we shall not stand for it…34

Later, Rassouli even sarcastically ‘backed’ Padilla’s warning that ‘the issue
[would] not end here’ and that IFs’ sanctions would ensue, envisaging that the AGF’s
admission of the ACSF against all odds would in fact trigger changes within the IFs. The
Iranian asserted this move would be ‘the beginning of [Asians’] rights or the claiming of
[their] rights with the International Federations’ as the ‘masters of [their] own destiny’.35
It should be noted that the aggressiveness and hostility of Rassouli’s rhetoric differed
greatly from the reverence and geniality reflected in the Iranian officials’ direct
interactions with the IOC and IFs. As aforementioned, maintaining and strengthening
relations with international sport governing bodies was also a priority for Tehran, but as
the latter’s representatives were not present at the AGF Council meeting—and because
of the AGF’s higher tolerance of governmental influence—Rassouli could resort to
provocative language in order to facilitate the swift admission of Communist China.
The incendiary rhetoric, however, did not eclipse the AGF and its leadership’s
overall adherence to institutionalism, which would help Iran uphold its benign relations
with the IOC and serve as the AGF’s most powerful defence in face of potential backlash.
The Iranian officials saw to that the Council meeting, from preparation to the final vote,
proceeded mostly, if not entirely, in deference to the organization’s constitution. An
interesting twist took place before the final vote: the ROC and the Philippine delegates
motioned that the approval of the Executive Committee resolution should require a twothirds majority on the ground that it involved the admission and expulsion of members,
but pro-Beijing delegates objected, arguing that it was a matter of representation instead
of admission.36 Unsurprisingly, Prince Pahlavi sided with the latter and justifiably denied
the motion with his executive power, though even if the AGF Council had passed this

motion, the voting result would have remained the same.37 The debate over this motion
delivered China its desired outcome from the very beginning—despite the fact that the
ACSF had had to apply for AGF membership as a new member organization, the AGF
Council voted to de facto transfer the ROCOC’s membership to the ACSF.
All in for the Games: Bridging the International Governing Bodies and China
The AGF’s decision caused quite an earthquake in international sport. That the IOC
would not discuss its patronage of the 1974 Asian Games until the following February
led to much uncertainty among various international sport governing bodies, whose
reactions varied. For example, the International Gymnastics Federation (FIG) wrote to
Rassouli, protesting the AGF’s expulsion of the ROCOC, to which the ROC Gymnastics
Association was affiliated.38 The FIG had previously agreed after meeting TAGOC
representatives in September 1973 to issue a special permit for the Chinese gymnasts to
take part in the gymnastics events of the Asian Games, but now decided to reverse its
decision in retaliation.39 Likewise, the FIFA not only notified the TAGOC of its
opposition, but also doubled down on the ban of member federations’ competition with
non-members, including the PRC’s football federation.40
Both pro-Beijing and pro-Taipei parties raised their lobbying efforts. Although
General Hodjat had as aforementioned proclaimed that Iran would join a united front
against the IOC’s and IF’s threats, Iran in fact went to great lengths to save the IOC’s
patronage to the Asian Games. As the ACSF was not considered an NOC, let alone an
IOC affiliate, the AGF and the TAGOC were on their own in striving for the IOC’s
continuous patronage. As soon as the special AGF Council meeting concluded, Prince
Pahlavi requested a meeting with Lord Killanin, who agreed to receive the AGF
President, Rassouli, and Prince Takeda before the IOC EB meeting in February.41 It was
later decided that Rassouli would also pay a visit to Lord Killanin in London in mid-

January, though the available archival documents do not detail the content of their
meeting.42 The Organizing Committee also lobbied IOC members. For example, Rassouli
twice contacted Vice President of the IOC, Willi Daume of West Germany, requesting a
meeting in order to solicit his public support, but Daume, who had been involved in a
China-related scandal, did not dare to meet the Iranian without Lord Killanin’s consent.43
After meeting Lord Killanin in private, Prince Pahlavi, Hassan Rassouli and
Richard Avory appeared in front of the IOC Executive Board and presented the AGF’s
and the TAGOC’s case. Prince Pahlavi first delivered a speech, in which he reviewed the
process of the AGF’s admission of the ACSF and called for the Executive Board’s support
for the Asian sport community’s decision for its own affairs.44 He reminded the Olympic
officials of the critical role the Asian Games played for the Olympic Movement in the
region, and swiftly warned that not accepting ‘the unquestionable realities of the world
of today’ and not accepting ‘the wishes of the overwhelming majority of Asian
countries… could cause the most shattering effects within international amateur sport’.45
Rassouli was then in charge of answering the EB members’ questions. The Iranian
first introduced the situation with individual IFs: among the 14 sports for which China
planned to field athletes, six had either admitted a Beijing-based national federation or
agreed to issue a special permit, while the other eight still needed to investigate the
matter.46 Rassouli further pointed out that AGF rules, which the IOC approved in 1952,
allowed the AGF to admit a national sport governing body that was ‘working towards
becoming an NOC’, of which Luc Silance, IOC’s legal counsel, had made Lord Killanin
aware.47 In fact, Lord Killanin was also informed that the recipient of the IOC’s patronage
was the AGF rather than the Asian Games of a certain year.48 As for his inflammatory
speech at the November AGF Council meeting, Rassouli ‘did not intend to apologise for
[his] statement’, but clarified that he ‘did not mean to be insultive [sic] to any IOC

members’.49 After rejecting several suggestions for alternative names for the Tehran
Asian Games, he concluded with his ‘deep, sincere wish that the IOC would retain its
patronage on the Asian Games, so that there would be no break-away groups of
organizations which were apart from the Olympic Movement’, a notion that echoed and
furthered Prince Pahlavi’s previous warning.50
Without specifying the ‘break-away groups’, Rassouli still managed to hint at the
precedent of the Games of New Emerging Forces movement that China and Indonesia
cofounded in 1963 to challenge the status quo of international and Asian sport governance
after the IOC sanctioned the Indonesian National Olympic Committee for Indonesia’s
denial of entry to Taiwanese and Israeli athletes.51 In fact, China had already resumed
shaking up Asian sport governance: it co-founded the Asian Table Tennis Union (ATTU)
in May 1972 after the Table Tennis Federation of Asia (TTFA) refused to expel Taiwan
in 1971. By the time the International Table Tennis Federation rescinded its patronage of
the TTFA in April 1973, there were only five members left in the TTFA—the ATTU had
25.52 The Organizing Committee’s message was inexplicit but clear: to safeguard the
integrity of the Olympic Movement in Asia, Lausanne must compromise.
To the TAGOC’s relief, the Executive Board members, under the advice of Lord
Killanin to ‘[bear] in mind the importance of the development of sport and the Olympic
idea in Asia’ voted to continue the IOC’s patronage to the AGF, which would
automatically extend to the Asian Games, while deploring the latter’s not inviting the
ROCOC to the Tehran Games.53 In addition, the Executive Board mandated that ‘[o]nly
competitors recognised by IFs can compete’—the tasks of negotiating with the TAGOC
and China were for the moment on the shoulder of the IFs.54
The negotiations with the IFs were two-fold. The membership of the PRC’s
national federations—which required the expulsion of their Taiwanese rivals because of

the PRC and ROC governments’ mutual intolerance—was one thing, which had to be
sorted out between China and the IFs, but many IFs’ ban on competition with nonmember federations—mandated by their constitutions—was another, and arguably a
more urgent matter. For the TAGOC, as long as the IFs agreed to issue a permit for the
events of their respective sports, the PRC’s membership or lack thereof would not matter
so much. Some IFs were more flexible, especially now that the IOC’s patronage was to
continue: the International Volleyball Federation (FIVB) had declined in January to issue
a license for the volleyball event despite the in-person lobbying of two TAGOC
representatives at its Executive Committee meeting, but was now working to make
China’s participation possible.55 The FIG also planned to issue a special permit after the
IOC confirmed its position upon its leadership’s inquiry.56
Table 1. Change of IF Affiliation and Permit Issuance Over Time.

Other IFs, on the other hand, had more rigid rules. The Marquess of Exeter,
President of the IAAF, wrote to Prince Pahlavi, deploring the AGF’s decision and
agreeing to issue only a Class C permit, which was intended for invitationals, instead of
a Class B permit for regional games.57 FIFA declined to issue a permit for football events
at all, citing its non-tolerance of the exclusion of its Taiwanese member in good standing
and China’s refusal to apply for membership, but the Iranian officials agreed to try to
persuade their Chinese interlocutors to take steps towards a formal application.58 The
FINA’s rule was the most difficult to circumvent, as it forbid the Bureau to issue a special
permit for events that involved former members, which the PRC’s swimming federation
was.59 In order to secure the FINA’s permit, the TAGOC promised that it would not invite
China’s diving, swimming, and water polo teams if there was no substantive improvement
from the negotiations between Beijing and the FINA.60
Despite the best efforts of the INOC and the TAGOC, the Chinese must negotiate
with the IFs themselves. Tehran certainly kept a close eye: Rassouli attended the 1974
rendition of the GAIF in Lucerne, Switzerland, in May, and delivered a report that
summarized the IFs’ progress with the China question.61 By the end of May, only five IFs
(athletics, badminton, cycling, football and swimming) remained undecided on China. By
the end of July, the number went down to three (cycling, football, swimming) in
Rassouli’s report to Lord Killanin.62 With two of them solving the eligibility issue by
mid-August, only the FINA Bureau (equivalent to Executive Board) still voted against a
permit for the Asian Games’ swimming events because of the Chinese Swimming
Association’s application letter did not comply to the FINA’s statutes.63 Iran attempted
to persuade the FINA President, Harold Henning, to convene the Bureau for another vote
to no avail, and talked China out of fielding athletes for the diving, swimming, and water
polo events, offering a post-Asian Games invitational in compensation.64 It was not until

shortly before the Games opened, when Henning and Chinese officials met in Tehran,
that a member of the Chinese delegation, He Zhenliang, thought of a way to make China’s
application for membership roughly comply with FINA’s requirements—Henning gave
his blessing just before the draw ceremony for the swimming events began.65 Finally,
Iran’s plan came into reality—the Tehran Games became the first Asian Games to include
contestants from mainland China that represented a third of Asia’s population. Even after
1974, China continued to have Iran’s steadfast support and advocacy in its global
campaign for Olympic membership.
Looking into the Future: Realized and Crushed Dreams
Iran—then the Imperial State of Iran—was a critical actor and broker in enabling the
AGF’s admission of the ACSF and the PRC’s eventual participation in all 14 disciplines
that the Chinese athletes were to enter at the 1974 Tehran Asian Games. It first, with the
support of other pro-Beijing nations of Asia, orchestrated the AGF’s replacement of the
ROCOC with the ACSF in 1973, and then facilitated fruitful negotiations between China
and the international sport governing bodies to ensure the issuance of event permits. It
should be noted that although Iranian officials at times resorted to hyperbole in expressing
intents to disrupt the status quo of international sport, Tehran, according to the minutes
of AGF meetings, achieved its goal largely through adhering to institutionalism of
international sport—in particular, the constitutions of both the AGF and the IOC were
observed in the process.
While China was the direct and major beneficiary of the AGF admission and the
Asian Games debut, Iran’s efforts were not completely altruistic. In fact, the Iranians were
eyeing a high return: within the realm of international sport, Iran demonstrated the
capabilities required for organizing international mega-events and presented its capital as
a strong candidate for hosting future Olympic Games; the fact that it brokered a deal

between China and international sport governing bodies could also boost its favourable
image with Lausanne and its affiliates. However, Tehran’s Olympic dream did not come
to fruition: the Pahlavi Dynasty was overthrown in the Islamic revolution in the late
1970s, and Tehran’s Olympic host city candidature was withdrawn. In the arena of
geopolitics, China as a rising power could help Tehran, a Middle Eastern power eyeing
regional hegemony, leverage its relations with the Soviet Union and the United States. In
addition, it was also in Iran’s interest to orchestrate a ‘limited anti-Western’ clashes with
the IOC and IFs in order to bolster its leadership in ‘forging an Asian Union of the littoral
states of the Indian Ocean’, as historian Stefan Huebner argues.66 The revolution also
changed the course of this plan: Iran remained a regional power and continued to have
China’s support, but anti-Western sentiments were no longer limited but took the centre
stage of Iran’s political terrain.67
Although Iran’s series of actions mostly presented the image of Beijing’s
advocate, and despite the occasional provocative statements of Iranian officials, such as
Hassan Rassouli, targeted at international governing bodies, Tehran managed to persuade
Beijing to make seemingly small but actually critical compromises at a time when China’s
radical sociopolitical environment during the Cultural Revolution would have
discouraged Chinese sports officials from cooperating with most international
organizations at all. Thanks to Iran’s good offices, the ACSF submitted an application for
AGF membership so that the AGF could discuss the matter at its meetings; Chinese
officials adopted a more proactive approach in communicating with international sports
officials; and the SSC partially internalized norms of international sport in Chinese sport
governance. These small concessions not only led to China’s Asian Games debut, but
also would trigger a series of shifts that would complete China’s rehabilitation in
international sport and realize Beijing’s Olympic dream—the final step of which being

an IOC resolution that allowed China and Taiwan to willingly co-exist within the
Olympic Movement in 1979.
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